The Sovereignty Illusion: Why the DMA May Be Strengthening US Tech Giants Instead of Europe

By Industry Analysis Desk
July 9, 2026

The European Union’s flagship regulatory ambition—the Digital Markets Act (DMA)—was designed to break the stranglehold of "gatekeeper" platforms and foster a more competitive, European-led digital ecosystem. However, a provocative new working paper by Jan Blockx, an assistant professor at the University of Antwerp and a seasoned assessor at the Belgian Competition Authority, suggests that the EU’s quest for "digital sovereignty" may be built on a fundamental miscalculation.

In his 17-page analysis titled "The DMA’s Contribution to EU Digital Sovereignty," published via the Social Science Research Network (SSRN), Blockx argues that while the DMA successfully increases "contestability" (the ability for firms to compete), it does not necessarily translate into "sovereignty." Instead, he posits that the primary beneficiaries of these new rules are often just other American technology giants, leaving the EU’s dependence on foreign infrastructure largely intact.

Main Facts: Redefining Sovereignty in Cyberspace

Blockx approaches the concept of digital sovereignty with surgical precision, moving away from amorphous political rhetoric toward a functional, measurable definition. Drawing on 16th-century jurist Jean Bodin and the 1933 Montevideo Convention, Blockx argues that traditional notions of territorial statehood fail to account for the borderless nature of Big Tech.

Instead, he proposes a "functional test": Digital sovereignty is compromised whenever an irreplaceable share of digital services within the EU is controlled by entities answerable to a single foreign government. Under this lens, the EU’s goal should be the diversification of power. If a European company loses market share to Google, only for that share to be captured by Microsoft or Amazon, the EU has gained nothing in terms of sovereignty—it has merely swapped one American master for another.

This distinction is critical. Brussels policy circles have long operated under the assumption that "opening the gate" is a victory in itself. Blockx’s research suggests this is a category error: "Increased contestability of the position of Google Search," he writes, "will therefore not be sufficient to reduce the EU’s dependency on US providers."

Chronology of the DMA Enforcement Era

To understand the current impasse, one must look at the rapid-fire regulatory environment of the past 24 months:

• 2024: The International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor Karim Khan requests arrest warrants for high-ranking Israeli officials. The subsequent US sanctions against the ICC in 2025 lead to Microsoft revoking the court’s email access—a stark demonstration of how digital dependence can compromise institutional autonomy.
• January 2026: The European Commission opens formal specification proceedings (Case DMA.100209) to force Alphabet to share search-ranking and query data with competitors.
• March 2026: Eighteen European industry groups petition the Commission to take decisive action against Google’s search dominance, citing lack of compliance.
• June 3, 2026: The EU General Court annuls Facebook Marketplace’s gatekeeper status but upholds Messenger’s designation, reinforcing the Commission’s focus on communication networks.
• July 2, 2026: The Court of Justice of the European Union confirms a massive 4.125 billion euro fine against Google for anti-competitive practices in the Android market, a case dating back to original complaints from Microsoft-backed lobby groups.
• July 8, 2026: Jan Blockx releases his working paper, igniting a debate among legal scholars and policymakers regarding the long-term effectiveness of the DMA.

Supporting Data: The Scale of the Dependency

The data cited by Blockx paints a sobering picture. A 2022 report by Paul Timmers estimated that the EU relies on foreign entities for over 80 percent of its digital products and intellectual property. As of mid-2026, seven companies—Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Microsoft, Meta, ByteDance (Cayman Islands-based), and Booking—hold gatekeeper status across 23 designated services.

In the search market, where Google maintains a 90 percent share, the "European" alternative is nonexistent at the top tier. While firms like Ecosia and Qwant are attempting to build a European search-ranking algorithm, they remain dwarfed by Microsoft’s Bing—the second-largest search engine in Europe.

The pattern repeats across sectors:

• Video: YouTube reaches 97 percent of the EU population. The primary alternative, France’s Dailymotion, holds less than 10 percent. Any shift in traffic from YouTube is more likely to flow to TikTok or Instagram than to local European platforms.
• Messaging: While the DMA forced WhatsApp to enable limited interoperability, the primary beneficiaries are secondary US players and other Meta-owned services, not small-scale European startups.
• Operating Systems: Despite data portability requirements, the primary switching destinations remain Android and iOS—both firmly under American control.

Official Responses and Regulatory Tensions

The European Commission has largely maintained that the DMA is a competition tool, not a protectionist one. However, the paper highlights a paradox: the DMA’s reliance on "forced access" mirrors public utility regulations. In telecommunications and energy, such rules prevent monopolies but often entrench incumbents by making it easier for third parties to "piggyback" on existing networks rather than build independent, sovereign infrastructure.

"If software and hardware makers can achieve full interoperability with Android or iOS," Blockx notes, "they have less incentive to build for an entirely separate, alternative operating system." By focusing on making the gatekeeper’s house more accessible, the EU may be inadvertently discouraging the construction of a new house altogether.

Furthermore, the paper highlights the "American-on-American" nature of antitrust complaints. Historically, major fines levied by the EU against companies like Google or Apple have been driven by complaints from other American giants—such as Microsoft, Yelp, or Epic Games—seeking to improve their own market position. These companies have the legal, financial, and technical resources to capitalize on DMA compliance rulings, whereas European SMEs often lack the scale to migrate or interoperate effectively.

Implications for the Future

The implications of Blockx’s research are profound for stakeholders across the European tech landscape:

For Marketers and Advertisers

Professionals should temper their expectations regarding "European alternatives." While choice screens (such as those seen in web browsers) have driven a measurable uptick in Firefox usage, the beneficiary is still an American nonprofit. The competitive landscape will likely remain dominated by US firms, meaning advertisers should focus on cross-platform strategies rather than waiting for a "European wave" of new platforms to emerge.

For Policymakers

The paper acts as a warning: the DMA cannot be the sole vehicle for digital sovereignty. Blockx recommends shifting focus toward the "Savings and Investment Union," which would allow European tech firms to raise the capital necessary to compete on a global scale. Additionally, procurement rules must be tightened to ensure that public sector bodies move away from foreign infrastructure, as seen in the ICC’s successful migration to the open-source openDesk suite.

For Strategic Planners

The absence of gatekeepers in critical sectors like cloud computing—currently under investigation—remains a major gap. As the Commission reviews the DMA’s first years of operation, the focus must shift from merely "opening access" to "fostering native growth." Without a mechanism to support the growth of European-headquartered, independent, and resilient digital infrastructure, the DMA risks becoming a tool that merely rearranges the chairs on the deck of a foreign-owned ship.

Ultimately, Blockx’s analysis suggests that while the DMA is a triumph of legal engineering, it is not yet a victory for digital independence. The "sovereignty" that European regulators seek requires more than just competition—it requires the capital, the infrastructure, and the political will to build alternatives that exist outside the current transatlantic duopoly. As the Commission looks toward its next phase of enforcement, the question remains: can the EU build a digital future that is truly its own?